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Abstract 
This paper characterizes welfare in a small open economy and derives the corresponding 
optimal monetary policy rule. It shows that the utility-based loss function for a small open 
economy is a quadratic expression in domestic inflation, output gap and real exchange rate. In 
contrast to previous works, this paper demonstrates that welfare in a small open economy, 
completely integrated with the rest of the world, is affected by exchange rate variability. 
Consequently, the optimal policy in a small open economy is not isomorphic to a closed 
economy and does not prescribe a pure floating exchange rate regime. Domestic inflation 
targeting is optimal only under a particular parameterization, where the unique relevant 
distortion in the economy is price stickiness. Under a general specification for preferences 
and in the presence of inefficient steady state output, exchange rate targeting arises as part of 
the optimal monetary plan. 
 
JEL Classification: F41, E52, E58, E61 
Keywords: Welfare, Optimal Monetary Policy, Small Open Economy 
 
 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Globalisation Programme.  The Centre for 
Economic Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank Gianluca Benigno, Nobu Kiyotaki, Fabio Ghironi, Kosuke Aoki, Andrei 
Sarychev, Lars Svensson and Massimiliano Pisani for useful comments. 
 Bianca De Paoli is an Occasional Research Assistant at the Centre for Economic 
Performance, London School of Economics.  Correspondence:  Bianca De Paoli, Department 
of Economics, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United 
Kingdom.  E-mail:  b.s.de-paoli@lse.ac.uk  
 
 
 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval 
system or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of 
the publisher nor be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it 
is published. 
 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent 
to the editor at the above address. 
 
© Bianca De Paoli, submitted 2004 
 
ISBN 0 7530 1765 2 
1 Introduction
Should monetary policy target the exchange rate? Numerous papers have analyzed the choice of mon-
etary policy objectives in closed and open economies. In the former, the debate has mainly focused
on whether ination should be the unique policy target. In open economies, the characterization of
optimal policy extends beyond policy makersdecision to concentrate on domestic price distortions.
More specically, the role of the exchange rate in the monetary policy framework needs to be consid-
ered. This work addresses this particular issue in a small open economy setting. Our results suggest
that including the exchange rate as part of the stabilization goals of monetary policy can be welfare
improving from a small open economy point of view.
The present work lays out a small open economy model as a limiting case of a two country dynamic
general equilibrium framework featuring monopolistic competition and price stickiness. Moreover, the
framework assumes no trade frictions (i.e. the law of one price holds) and perfect capital markets (i.e.
asset markets are complete). This benchmark specication allows us to focus on the policy implications
of the following factors: (a) Calvo-type staggered price setting; (b) monopolistic competition in goods
production and the resulting ine¢ cient level of output; (c) trade imbalances; and (d) deviations from
purchasing power parity that arise from the home bias specication. The framework presented here
encompasses, as special cases, the closed economy setting (as in Benigno and Woodford, 2003) and the
small open economy case with a specic degree of monopolistic competition and no trade imbalances
(as in Gali and Monacelli, 2005).
The small open economy representation prevents domestic policy from a¤ecting the rest of the
world and, therefore, permits us to abstract from strategic interactions between countries. We focus on
understanding how monetary authorities should react to uctuations in internal and external conditions,
when these reactions have no feedback e¤ects.
Following the method developed by Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Sutherland (2002), we derive
the loss function for a small open economy from the utility of the representative household. We show
that the small open economys loss function is a quadratic expression in domestic producer ination,
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the output gap and the real exchange rate. The weights given to each of these variables depend
on structural parameters of the model, and therefore, are determined by the underlying economic
ine¢ ciencies. In addition, the policy targets depend on the source of the disturbance a¤ecting the
economy, which includes an external shock.
The analytical representation of welfare allows for a precise qualitative analysis of monetary policy
in a small open economy. The results obtained show that domestic ination targeting is optimal only
under a particular parameterization of the model. In cases where the economy experiences productivity
and foreign shocks, a domestic ination target is optimal only under a particular parameterization for
the coe¢ cient risk aversion and the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods.
Moreover, if scal disturbances are also present, the optimality of domestic price stabilization further
requires a production subsidy. Conversely, in the general specication of the model, the exchange rate
becomes part of monetary policy targets. Therefore, the policy prescription in a small open economy
is not isomorphic to a closed economy and does not prescribe a pure oating exchange rate regime.
Moreover, the quantitative results show that for a large set of parameter specications, an exchange
rate peg outperforms a strict domestic ination target. This result is consistent with the ndings
of Sutherland (2005). The author demonstrates that for high values of the elasticity of substitution
between goods a xed exchange rate regime leads to higher welfare than targeting domestic prices.
The results obtained in this paper add to the rich debate on optimal monetary policy. Studies
such as Woodford (2002) and Woodford and Benigno (2003) were pioneer in deriving a quadratic
loss function (from the utility of the representative household) for a closed economy. The authors
show how distortions created by monopolistic competition a¤ect the optimality of price stabilization.
In an open economy setting, Corsetti and Pesenti (2000) were the rst to emphasize that a country
might benet from inuencing its terms of trade. Benigno and Benigno (2003) illustrate the potential
gains from cooperation of monetary policy between countries by analyzing the incentives of individual
countries to a¤ect the exchange rate. Gali and Monacelli (2004) derive the loss function, for a particular
characterization of a small open economy, which was shown to be analogous to a closed economy. The
present work aims at contributing to the literature by characterizing a general loss function for a small
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open economy which leads to a better understanding of the international dimension of monetary policy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and derives the
small open economy dynamics. Section 3 is dedicated to the derivation of welfare and the quadratic
loss function. Section 4 analyses the optimal plan and the performance of standard policy rule. Section
5 concludes.
2 The Model
The framework consists of a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with complete asset mar-
kets. Deviations from purchasing power parity arise from the existence of home bias in consumption.
The dimension of this bias depends on the degree of openness and the relative size of the economy.
This specication allows us to characterize the small open economy by taking the limit of the home size
to zero. Prior to applying the limit, we derive the optimal equilibrium conditions for the general two
country model. After the limit is taken, the two countries Home and Foreign represent the small open
economy and the rest of the world, respectively.
Monopolistic competition and sticky prices are introduced in the small open economy in order to
address issues of monetary policy. We further assume that home price setting follows a Calvo-type
contract, which introduces richer dynamic e¤ects of monetary policy than a setup where prices are
set one period in advance. Moreover, we abstract from monetary frictions by considering a cashless
economy, as in Woodford (2003, Chapter 2).
2.1 Preferences
We consider two countries, H (Home) and F (Foreign). The world economy is populated with a
continuum of agents of unit mass, where the population in the segment [0; n) belongs to country H
and the population in the segment (n; 1] belongs to country F . The utility function of a consumer j
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in country H is given by1 :
U jt = Et
1X
s=t
s t

U(Cjs)  V (ys(h); "Y;s)

; (1)
Households obtain utility from consumption U(C) and contribute to the production of a di¤erenti-
ated good y(h) attaining disutility V (y(h); "Y;)2 . Productivity shocks are denoted by "Y;s. Moreover,
C is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of home and foreign goods as
C =
h
v
1
C
 1

H + (1  v)
1
C
 1

F
i 
 1
; (2)
where  > 0 is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution and CH and CF are the two consumption
sub-indices that refer to the consumption of home-produced and foreign-produced goods, respectively.
The parameter determining home consumers preference for foreign goods, (1   v); is a function of
the relative size of the foreign economy, 1   n; and of the degree of openness, ; more specically,
(1  v) = (1  n):
Similar preferences are specied for the rest of the world:
C =
h
v
1
C
  1
H + (1  v)
1
C
  1
F
i 
 1
; (3)
with v = n. That is, foreign consumerspreferences for home goods depend on the relative size
of the home economy and the degree of openness. Note that the specication of v and v generates a
home bias in consumption, as in Sutherland (2002).
The sub-indices CH (CH) and CF (C

F ) are Home (Foreign) consumption of the di¤erentiated prod-
1 In the next sections we assume the following isoelastic functional forms: U(Ct) =
C
1 
t
1  and V (yt; "Y;t) =
"
 
Y;t
y
1+
t
1+
:
Where  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and  is equivalent to the inverse of the elasticity of labor production.
2This specication would be equivalent to one in which the labour market is decentralized. These rms employ workers
who have disutility of supplying labour and this disutility is separable from the consumption utility.
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ucts produced in countries H and F . These are dened as follows:
CH =
"
1
n
 1

Z n
0
c (z)
 1
 dz
# 
 1
CF =
"
1
1  n
 1

Z 1
n
c (z)
 1
 dz
# 
 1
(4)
CH =
"
1
n
 1

Z n
0
c (z)
 1
 dz
# 
 1
CF =
"
1
1  n
 1

Z 1
n
c (z)
 1
 dz
# 
 1
; (5)
where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across the di¤erentiated products. The consumption-
based price indices that correspond to the above specications of preferences are given by:
P =
h
vP 1 H + (1  v) (PF )1 
i 1
1 
;  > 0 (6)
P  =
h
vP 1 H + (1  v) (P F )1 
i 1
1 
;  > 0; (7)
where PH (P H) is the price sub-index for home-produced goods expressed in the domestic (foreign)
currency and PF (P F ) is the price sub-index for foreign produced goods expressed in the domestic
(foreign) currency.
PH =

1
n
Z n
0
p (z)
1 
dz
 1
1 
; PF =

1
1  n
Z 1
n
p (z)
1 
dz
 1
1 
(8)
P H =

1
n
Z n
0
p (z)1  dz
 1
1 
; P F =

1
1  n
Z 1
n
p (z)1  dz
 1
1 
: (9)
Moreover, we assume that the law of one price holds, therefore:
p(h) = Sp(h) and p(f) = Sp(f); (10)
where the nominal exchange rate St denotes the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic
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currency. Therefore, equations (6), (7) together with condition (10), imply that PH = SP H and
PF = SP

F . However, as equations (8) and (9) illustrate, the home bias specication leads to deviations
from purchasing power parity, that is, P 6= SP 3 . For this reason, we dene the real exchange rate as
RS = SP

P :
From consumerspreferences, we can derive the total demand for a generic good h, produced in
country H, and the demand for a good f; produced in country F:
yd(h) =

p(h)
PH
 (
PH
P
  "
vC +
v(1  n)
n

1
RS
 
C
#
+G
)
(11)
yd(f) =

p(f)
PF
 8>><>>:

PF
P
  h (1 v)n
1 n C + (1  v)
 
1
RS
 
C
i
+G
9>>=>>; ; (12)
where G and G are country-specic government shocks. We assume that the public sector in the
Home (Foreign) economy only consumes Home (Foreign) goods and has preferences for di¤erentiated
goods analogous to the ones of the private sector (given by equations 4 and 5). The government budget
constraints in the Home and Foreign economy are respectively given by:
 t
Z n
0
pt(h)yt(h)dh = nPH;t(Gt + Trt) (13)
 t
Z 1
n
pt (f)y

t (f)dh = (1  n)PF;t(Gt + Trt ): (14)
We consider the case in which uctuations in proportional taxes  t (t ) or government spending Gt
(Gt ) are exogenous and completely nanced by lump-sum transfers Trt (Tr

t ); made in the form of
domestic (foreign) goods.
Finally, to portray our small open economy we use the denition of v and v and take the limit for
3The literature investigating the empirical evidences of Purchasing Power Parity is vast and has shown that the short
run deviations from PPP are large and volatile (as documented in Rogo¤ (1996)). Even though our model specication
is in accordance with these ndings, it dismisses the evidences of failures of the law of one price.
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n! 0. Consequently, conditions (11) and (12) can be rewritten as:
yd(h) =

p(h)
PH
 (
PH
P
  "
(1  )C + 

1
RS
 
C
#
+Gt
)
(15)
yd(f) =

p(f)
P F
  (
P F
P 
 
C +G
)
: (16)
Equations (15) and (16) show how external changes in consumption a¤ect the small open economy,
but the reverse is not true. Moreover, movements in the real exchange rate do not modify the rest of
the worlds demand.
2.2 The asset market structure
We assume that, as in Chari et al. (2002), markets are complete domestically and internationally.
In each period t; the economy faces one of the nitely many events, st 2  (where  is the set of
nitely many states). We denote the history of events up to and including period t by xt. Looking
ahead from period t; the conditional probability of occurrence of state st+1 is (st+1 j xt). The initial
realization s0 is given. We represent the asset structure by having complete contingent one period
nominal bonds denominated in the home currency. We let Bj
 
st+1

denote the home consumers
holdings of this bond, which pays one unit of the home currency if state st+1 occurs and 0 otherwise,
and we let Q(st+1 j xt) denote the price of one unit of such a bond at date t and state st in units of
domestic currency. Therefore, consumer j faces a sequence of budget constraints given by:
P (st)Cj(st) +
X
st2
Q(st+1 j xt)Bj(st+1)  Bj  st+ (1   t)pj(st)yj(st)dh+ PH(st)Tr(st): (17)
A similar expression can be derived for the foreign economy. Households at home maximize (1)
subject to (17) and their optimal allocation of wealth across the di¤erent state contingent bonds implies
that
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Q(st+1 j xt) = (st+1 j xt)UC
 
C(st+1)

UC (C(st))
P (st)
P (st+1)
: (18)
Similarly for the foreign economy:
Q(st+1 j xt) = (st+1 j xt)UC
 
C(st+1)

UC (C(st))
S(st)P (st)
S(st+1)P (st+1)
: (19)
Therefore, the optimal risk sharing setting implies that the intertemporal marginal rate of substitu-
tion (in nominal terms) is equalized across countries.
UC
 
Ct+1

UC (Ct )
P t
P t+1
=
UC (Ct+1)
UC (Ct)
St+1Pt
StPt+1
: (20)
Equation (20) holds in all states of nature. This specication for the asset market implies that
the risk arising from movements in agents nominal wealth is shared with the rest of the world. How-
ever, because of deviations from purchasing power parity, real exchange rate movements may lead to
di¤erences between home and foreign real income and, consequently, di¤erences in the evolution of
consumption across borders.
2.3 Price-setting Mechanism
Prices follow a partial adjustment rule a la Calvo (1983). Producers of di¤erentiated goods know the
form of their individual demand functions (given by equations (15) and (16)), and maximize prots
taking the overall market prices and products as given. In each period a fraction  2 [0; 1) of randomly
chosen producers is not allowed to change the nominal price of the good it produces. The remaining
fraction of rms, given by (1   ); chooses prices optimally by maximizing the expected discounted
value of prots4 . Therefore, the optimal choice of producers that can set their price ~pt(j) at time T
4All households within a country (that can modify their prices at a certain time) face the same discounted value of
the streams of current and future marginal costs. Thus, they choose to set the same price.
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is:
Et
(X
()T tUc(CT )

~pt(j)
PH;t
 
YH;T

~pt(j)
PH;T
PH;T
PT
  
(1  T )(   1)
Vy (~yt;T (j); "Y;T )
Uc(CT )
)
= 0
(21)
Monopolistic competition in production leads to a wedge between marginal utility of consumption
and marginal disutility of production, represented by (1 t)( 1)
5 . We allow for uctuations on this
wedge by assuming a time varying proportional tax  t. Hereafter, we refer to these uctuations as
mark up shocks t, where t =

(1 t)( 1) .
Given the Calvo-type setup, the price index evolves according to the following law of motion:
(PH;t)
1  = P 1 H;t 1 + (1  ) (~pt(h))1  : (22)
The rest of the world has an analogous price setting mechanism.
2.4 A log-linear representation of the model
In this section we present a log linear version of the model. This is done in order to obtain a simple
representation of the optimality conditions derived above and illustrate the dynamic properties of the
model. Moreover, we later solve the log-linearized model numerically using the algorithm of King and
Watson (1998) and present a quantitative analysis of the model. We approximate the model around a
steady state in which the exogenous variables ("y;t,Gt, t) assume the values "y  0; G = 0;   1; and
producer price ination is set as H;t  PH;t=PH;t 1 = 1. In addition, in this steady-state RS = 1,
C = C, Y = Y  and UC( C) =  Vy( Y ; 0)6 . Log deviations from the steady state are denoted with a
hat.
The small open economy system of equilibrium conditions derived from log linearizing equations (6),
(15), (20) and (21) is:
5Note that if there are no proportional taxation and an innitely elastic demand  = 1: This specication characterizes
the perfect competition case.
6This specication implies a specic level of initial distribution of wealth across countries. Appendix A contains the
full characterization of the steady state.
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(1  )p^H + cRS = 0 (23)
Y^t =  p^H + (1  )C^ + C^ + cRSt + g^t (24)
C^t = C^

t +
1

cRSt (25)
bHt = k  bCt + bYt   bpH + bt   b"Y;t+ EtbHt+1 (26)
Equation (23) describes the relationship between domestic relative prices (pH;t = PH;t=Pt) and the
the real exchange rate. Equation (24) characterizes the demand for domestic goods, with g^t dened as
Gt G
Y
. The risk sharing condition is described in equation (25). Finally, the last equation represents
the small open economy Phillips Curve. We dene k = (1   )(1   )=(1 + ) and Ht denotes
the producer price ination, i.e. H;t  ln(PH;t=PH;t 1). Moreover, it is clear from equation (26),
that a policy of pure domestic price stabilization, that sets bHt = 0 in every state, leads to the same
equilibrium allocation as the case in which prices are perfectly exible, i.e. when  = 0; and therefore
k !1:
The system of structural equilibrium conditions is closed by specifying the monetary policy rule.
In this paper we consider the case in which monetary policy follows an optimal monetary policy. We
represent the optimal plan in the form of a targeting rule. Targeting rules, as expressed in Svensson
(2005), are a description of "goal directed monetary policy". Contrary to Taylor rules, an explicit
expression for the evolution of the monetary policy instrument (i.e. the nominal interest rate) is not
specied7 . Gianonni and Woodford (2003) describe these rules as exible ination targets. Following
this class of rules, the central bank stabilizes movements in the target variables in order to implement
the most e¢ cient allocation of resources (i.e. targeting rules are derived from a microfounded welfare
7For further discussion on targeting rules and instrumental rules see McCallum and Nelson (2005).
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maximization problem). Moreover, apart from the case in which monetary policy is represented by
an optimal targeting rule, we also consider the case in which the central bank follows standard policy
rules. In particular, we analyze the performance of a producer price index (PPI) ination targeting
regime, an exchange rate peg, and a consumer price index (CPI) ination target.
Therefore, the dynamics of bYt; cRSt; bCt; bHt and bpH;t are determined by equations (23) to (26) together
with the specied monetary policy, given the domestic exogenous variables b"y;t,bgt, bt and the external
shock bCt 8 :
Foreign dynamics are governed by the foreign Phillips curve and foreign demand:
bt = k  bCt + bY t + bt   b"Y;t+ Etbt+1 (27)
Y^ t = C^
 + g^t : (28)
The specication of the foreign policy rule completes the system of equilibrium conditions, which
determine the evolution of Y^ t ; C^
 and bt . We should note that the dynamics of the rest of the world
is not a¤ected by Home variables. Therefore, the small open economy can treat Ct as exogenous.
Moreover, the policy choice of the rest of the world modies the way in which foreign structural shocks
a¤ect Ct
9 but does not inuence how the latter a¤ects the small open economy.
3 Welfare
The advantage of a microfounded model is that agentsdiscounted sum of expected utility provides
a precise measure for welfare. That is, the small open economy objective function can be obtained
from equation (1). We follow the method developed by Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford
(2003) and obtain a quadratic expression for equation (1). This allows us to represent the policy
8 In order to retrieve the value of the nominal exchange rate and interest rate we can use households intertemporal
choice (i.e. the Euler equation) and the denition of the real exchange rate.
9For example, if the foreign authority is following a strict ination target the evolution of domestic consumption is
given by: (+ ) bCt = b"Y;t   bgt   bt
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problem in a comprehensive manner. That is, policy makers minimize a quadratic loss function subject
to linear constraints. Moreover, the resulting optimal monetary policy can be expressed analytically.
Alternative approaches to welfare evaluation include the computational methods described in Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2004), Collard and Juillard (2000) and Kim et al. (2003). These techniques are
based on perturbation methods and deliver a numerical evaluation of the optimal policy problem.
We should note that the linear quadratic approach presented here take into account the e¤ect of
second moments in the mean of the endogenous variables. As discussed in Benigno and Woodford
(2004), this ensures that the method delivers an accurate (local) welfare evaluation tool. Another
important contribution that emphasizes the relevance of second order e¤ects on the mean of variables
is Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1998).
In the appendix we derive a second order approximation to equation (1). In order to eliminate the
discounted linear terms in the Taylor expansion, we use a second order approximation to some of the
structural equilibrium conditions and obtain a complete second order solution for the evolution of the
endogenous variables of interest. It follows that the nal expression for the small open economy loss
function can be written as a quadratic function of bYt; cRSt; and bHt :
Lto = Uc CEt0
X
t

1
2
Y (bYt   bY Tt )2 + 12RS(cRSt   cRSTt )2 + 12(bHt )2

+ t:i:p; (29)
where the policy targets bY Tt and cRSTt are functions of the various shocks and, in general, do not
coincide with the exible price allocation for output and the real exchange rate. Moreover, the weights
of ination, output and the real exchange rate gap in welfare losses, ;Y and RS ; all depend on the
structural parameters of the model. The expressions for these variables are specied in the appendix.
Moreover, the term t:i:p stands for terms independent of policy.
What are the economic forces behind these welfare losses? The small open economy specication
presented in this work is characterized by two economic ine¢ ciencies: price rigidity and monopolistic
competition in production. In addition, in an open economy, domestic consumption is not necessarily
equal to domestic production. In particular, movements in international relative prices can create
di¤erences between the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal disutility of production that
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directly a¤ect welfare10 . These three factors create di¤erent policy incentives. The presence of
staggered prices brings in gains from minimizing relative price uctuations (justifying the presence
(bHt )2 in equation (29)). Moreover, monopolistic competition in production implies a suboptimal
level of steady state output and introduces an incentive to reduce the steady state production ine¢ ciency.
Finally, there may be incentives to manage uctuations in the exchange rate in order to a¤ect the wedge
between the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal disutility of production (hereafter this
is referred as the "Uc=Vy gap"). The last two factors imply that optimal monetary policy might
deviate from price stability (and are responsible for the presence of the terms Y (bYt   bY Tt )2 and
RS(cRSt   cRSTt )2 in equation 29).
To better understand the argument presented above, we rst characterize a closed economy by
setting  = 0. In this case, equation (29) can be written as:
Lcto = Uc CEt0
X
t

1
2
cY (bYt   bY T;ct )2 + 12c(bHt )2

+ t:i:p; (30)
where the subscript c denotes the closed economy. The policy makers problem in a closed economy
can be illustrated by the relative weight of ination with respect to output =Y and by the di¤erence
between bY Tt and bY Flext (where bY Flext represents the exible price allocation for output).
c
cY
=

k( + )
(31)
bY T;ct = "Y;t( + )   (  1)( + 1)t( + )( + + (  1)) + (+ )gt( + )( + + (  1)) (32)
bY Flex;ct = "Y;t   t + gt( + ) : (33)
As the above expressions show, bY T;ct 6= bY Flex;ct , that is, a policy of strict ination targeting (which
10This is represented by the term Uc C( bCt bYt=) in the Taylor expansion of the utility function (shown in the appendix).
Note that in our linear-quadratic aproach this term is expressed in terms of second moments. In particular, it can be
written as a function of the variance of the real exchange rate and output gap.
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mimics the exible price allocation) does not close the welfare relevant output gap. Therefore, there
is a trade-o¤ between stabilizing ination and output. Moreover, the weight of ination relative to
output in the loss function depends essentially on the degree of market power  and the degree of price
rigidity  (which determines the parameter k). When the elasticity of substitution between goods is
innite, i.e. the market is competitive, then the relative weight on the output gap vanishes. On the
other hand, when   ! 0 (and consequently k  ! 1), the relative weight on ination fades away as
there are no distortions associated with price rigidity. Furthermore, the steady state level of mark up,
; and mark up uctuations, t; imply di¤erences between bY Tt and bY Flext . Whenever the steady state
level of production is e¢ cient, i.e.  = 1; and there are no mark up uctuations, we have bY Tt = bY Flext :
On the other hand, in a small open economy, in addition to domestic prices and output uctuations,
real exchange rate movements also a¤ect welfare. This is because the exchange rate can generate
uctuations in the so called "Uc=Vy gap". As shown in equation (24) and (23), the real exchange
rate inuences the relative price of Home produced goods and modies the small open economys
demand. Secondly, in a world where purchasing power parity does not hold, real exchange rate
movements generate real wealth variations, which, in turn, create uctuations in householdsspending
and consumption (this can be seen by inspection of equation (25)). It follows that the impact of the real
exchange rate on output and consumption a¤ects the wedge between marginal utility of consumption
and marginal disutility of production. And uctuations in this gap have an e¤ect on the small open
economys welfare.
The value of intertemporal and intratemporal elasticities of substitution, 1= and , determine the
real exchange rate e¤ect on consumption and output through the risk sharing and demand channels
explained above. Therefore, the weight of the real exchange rate in the loss function, RS , depends
crucially on these parameters. More specically, when  = 1 the real exchange rate does not a¤ect
the "Uc=Vy gap" and RS = 0 . Section 4.1 explores this special case in detail. In addition, when
the economy is relatively close, the welfare implications of real exchange rate movements are small (as
expected, when   ! 0; RS  ! 0):
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4 Optimal Monetary Policy
After characterizing the policy objective, we now turn to the constraints of the policy problem. The
rst constraint the policy maker faces is given by the Phillips Curve:
bHt = k (Y^t   bY Tt ) + (1  ) 1(cRSt   cRSTt ) + ut+ EtbHt+1; (34)
where ut is a linear combination of the shocks dened in the appendix. The policy problem is
further constrained by the small open economy aggregate demand equation (24) and the risk sharing
condition (20). Combining these two conditions, the following relationship between output and the
real exchange rate arises:
(bYt   bY Tt ) = (cRSt   cRSTt ) (1 + l)(1  ) + ut; (35)
where l = (   1) (2  ) and  is a vector whose elements depend on the structural parameters
(as shown in the appendix). From equation (34) we can see that the policy targets bY Tt and cRSTt are
not necessarily the exible price allocations of output and the real exchange rate. That is, the targets
do not coincide with the allocations that would prevail if  = 0 (and consequently k !1). Moreover,
equation (35) shows that closing the output gapdoes not eliminate thereal exchange rate gap.
We proceed by characterizing the optimal plan under the assumption that policy makers can commit
to maximizing the economys welfare. We lay out the Ramsey problem and derive the optimal policy
response to the di¤erent shocks. The policy problem consists of choosing a path for fbHt ; bYt; cRStg in
order to minimize (29), subject to the constraints (34) and (35), and given the initial conditions bt0 and
bYt0 . This last condition implies that the resulting set of rst order conditions does not internalize the
e¤ect of previous expectations of the initial policy. This method follows Woodfords (1999) timeless
perspective approach, and thereby ensures that the policy prescription does not constitute a time
inconsistent problem. In e¤ect, the constraints on the initial conditions impose that the rst order
condition to the problem are time invariant11 . The multipliers associated with (34) and (35) are
respectively '1 and '2. Thus, the rst order conditions with respect to bHt ; Y^t and cRSt are given by:
11For a discussion on the timeless perspective of optimal rule see Woodford, 2003.
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('1;t   '1;t 1) = kbHt (36)
'2;t   '1;t = Y (bYt   bY Tt ) (37)
 '2;t  

(1 + l)
'1;t =
(1  )
(1 + l)
RS(cRSt   cRSTt ): (38)
Combining equations (36), (37), and (38), we obtain the following expression:
(1 + l)Y(bYt   bY Tt ) + (1  )RS(cRSt   cRSTt ) + (+ (1 + l))k(bHt ) = 0; (39)
where  denotes the rst di¤erence operator. The above expression characterizes the small open
economy optimal targeting rule. It prescribes responding to movements in ination, output and the
real exchange rate12 . Moreover, equation (39) stipulates how monetary policy should respond to the
di¤erent shocks, according to the composition of bY Tt and cRSTt . When following this policy rule,
the central bank may allow some variability in ination in order to respond to costly movements in
other variables. Equation (39) indicates the policy makers behavior that minimizes welfare losses is
associated with such uctuations. It implements the most e¢ cient allocation of resources, conditional
on the structural characteristics of the economy.
In the appendix we show which parametric restrictions are needed for the above rst order conditions
to lead to a determinate equilibrium. The appendix also contains an analysis of whether the above rst
order conditions indeed characterize an optimal policy. That is, section D of the appendix investigates
if there is any alternative random policy that could improve welfare. As shown in Benigno and
Woodford (2003), this approach coincides with the investigation of whether the second order conditions
of the minimization problem are satised. It follows that some parameter specications violate these
conditions (those are shown in table 13 and 14).
12Even if we express equation (39) as a function of Consumer Price Index ination instead of producer price inationbHt , the targeting rule still includes the term (cRSt   cRSTt ).
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We now turn to the analysis of some special cases of the optimal plan. Moreover, we explore how
certain economic characteristics inuence the optimal monetary policy.
4.1 Producer Price Ination Target
Under certain circumstances, the loss function approximation leads to clear cut results in terms of
optimal policy. In this section we analyze when optimal policy consists of PPI (producer price index)
ination targeting, i.e., it prescribes complete domestic price stability. The conditions under which
this is true involve assumptions on the parameter values of the model and on the source of the shock
present in the economy.
In order to understand the ine¢ ciency of the exible price allocation in the general case and the
special cases where a strict ination target is optimal, it is useful to characterize the social planers
optimal allocation. In this section we step back from the linear quadratic analysis and compare our
non-linear equilibrium conditions with the social planers optimal allocation. The planners objective
is to maximize agents utility Ut subject to the small open economys demand and the risk sharing
condition, given by equations (11) and (20), and is further completed by the determination of relative
prices (equation (6)). Moreover, the small open economys social planner takes external conditions as
given. Hence, the social planners rst order condition can be written as
P eH;tUc(C
e
t ) = q
e
tVy (Y
e
t ; "Y;t) ; (40)
where qet =
h
1 + (   1) (RSet ) 1 + 1  (RSet )
 1

i
and the superscript e denotes the e¢ cient
allocation. The full characterization of the e¢ cient allocation can be obtained by combining the above
equation with the constraints of the policy problem (i.e. equations (6), (11), and (20)). Furthermore,
in steady state we have
Uc(Y
e
) =
1
(1  )Vy(Y
e
): (41)
On the other hand, in the decentralized problem, the equilibrium condition implied by monopolistic
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competition and price stickiness is given by the price setting equation (21). If we assume, however,
that prices are exible, the equilibrium condition (21) becomes
pFlexH;t Uc(C
Flex
t ) = tVy
 
Y Flext ; "Y;T

; (42)
and in steady state
Uc(Y
Flex
) = Vy(Y
Flex
): (43)
Therefore, comparing conditions (40) and (42), it is clear that even with perfectly exible prices,
mark up shocks and movements in the real exchange rate generate ine¢ cient uctuations in the ratio of
marginal disutility of production and marginal utility of consumption. In addition, unless  = 1=(1 );
the small open economy steady state output is ine¢ cient (this can be seen by inspection of equations
(41) and (43)). That is, in general, a policy of domestic price stabilization that mimics the exible
price allocation does not implement an e¢ cient allocation.
Nevertheless, if we impose that  = 1; the e¢ ciency condition (40) and the decentralized exible
price allocation (42) can be written as follows
(1  ) (Y et  Gt)  = " Y;t (Y et ) (44)
1
t
(Y Flext  Gt)  = " Y;t
 
Y Flext

: (45)
The above expressions are illustrated in Figure 1, where f(Yt; "t) = "
 
Y;tY

t , g
flex(Yt; t; Gt) =
1
t
(Yt  Gt)  ; and ge(Yt; Gt) = (1  )(Yt  Gt) . The ine¢ ciency of the steady state exible price
allocation is represented by the location of Y
flex
below Y
e
. Moreover, apart from the steady state
distortion, uctuations in the wedge between ge and gFlex characterize a departure from the e¢ cient
allocation given by (44) and also represent distortions present in the exible price equilibrium.
Figure 2 illustrates how mark up shocks impact the wedge between ge and gFlex. It shows that
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even with  = 1 and exible prices, mark up shocks generate distortions that a¤ect welfare. Hence,
there is an incentive to stabilize these shocks and depart from the exible price equilibrium (i.e. a
strict domestic ination target is not optimal).
Figure 3 shows how productivity shocks a¤ect e¢ ciency. In the case of  = 1, the equilibrium
exible price allocation and the e¢ cient allocation move proportionally to each other. This leaves the
welfare relevant wedge unchanged. Therefore, there are no welfare losses under price exibility and a
producer price ination targeting characterizes the optimal plan. The same result holds for the case
of foreign shocks. External disturbances do not appear in the expressions for f(:), gFlex(:) or ge(:).
Thus, these shocks also leave the wedge unchanged when  = 1. The intuition behind this result is
that, under this parametrization, the marginal e¤ect of the real exchange rate on consumption utility
and labour disutility o¤set each other and no stabilization process is needed.
Figure 4 shows the case of exogenous uctuations in government expenditure. Because scal shocks
do not a¤ect gflex and ge proportionally, their e¤ect on e¢ ciency depends on the steady state level of
output. In general, scal disturbances create ine¢ cient movements in the wedge between gflex and
ge; as represented in the gure. The only circumstance in which there are no such movements is when
the steady state level of output is e¢ cient (Y
flex
= Y

). This result is consistent with the ndings of
Benigno and Woodford (2004) in a closed economy setting.
Therefore, the assumptions needed in order to have an ination target as the optimal plan are: (1)
 = 1; (2) there should be no mark-up shocks (t = 0; 8 t); and, in the case of scal shocks, (3)
the steady state level of output ought to be e¢ cient from the small open economys point of view (i.e.
 = 1=(1 )). These conditions guarantee that the exible price equilibrium characterizes the e¢ cient
allocation.
Under this specication, the weights on the loss function are:
Y
(1  ) = ( + ) (46)
RS = 0 (47)
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
(1  ) =

k
: (48)
And the target for output is:
bY Tt = bY Flext = ( + ) 1 f"Y;t + gtg : (49)
The relative weights specied in equations (46) and (48) are analogous to those in the closed economy
and the policy target coincides with the exible price allocation. The assumption of  = 1=(1   )
guarantees that steady state output is e¢ cient from the point of view of the small open economy. In
addition, the restriction of  = 1, ensures that exchange rate movements do not a¤ect welfare since
its the marginal e¤ect on consumption utility and labour disutility o¤set each other. Moreover, the
optimal plan does not respond to external shocks. In what follows, under this specication, the optimal
monetary policy in a small open economy is isomorphic to a closed economy. This result is consistent
with the ndings of Gali and Monacelli (2005)13 .
4.2 Quantitative results
4.2.1 The General Optimal Plan:
In this section we present some numerical analysis of the optimal monetary policy. In our benchmark
specication we assume a unitary elasticity of intertemporal substitution, i.e.  = 1. Following
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) we assume  = 0:47. Furthermore, the elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign goods, , is assumed to be 314 (Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1998) argue that it
should be between 3 and 6). The degree of openness, ; is assumed to be 0:2; implying a 20% import
share of the GDP. In addition, the baseline calibration considers the case of a "optimal subsidy" policy,
where  is set such that  = 1=(1  ). Moreover, the elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated
goods  is assumed to be 10 as in Benigno and Benigno (2003). To characterize an average length of
13The authors have characterized the loss function for a small open economy in the case in which trade imbalances or
steady state monopolistic distortions are absent (i.e.  =  = 1 and  = 1= (1  )).
14This leads to a specication where Home and Foreign goods are substitutes in the utility, given that  > 1.
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price contract of 3 quarters, we assume  = 0:66. Finally, we assume  = 0:99. Starting from this
specication, we analyze how optimal monetary policy responds to the di¤erent shocks.
Figure 7 shows the impulse response of consumption, output, the real exchange rate and producer
price ination following a productivity shock. Comparing the optimal policy with an ination target
highlights that there are no quantitatively signicant di¤erences between the two. Under both regimes
a higher productivity at home increases domestic output and consumption. In addition, a larger supply
of domestic goods leads to a depreciation in the real exchange rate.
The zero measure specication of the Home economy enables us to study how the monetary authority
should respond to uctuations on external conditions, when there are no feedback e¤ects. Figure 6
presents the impulse response of the various domestic variables to a foreign shock - represented by an
innovation in Ct . Again, the optimal plan is quantitatively similar to an ination targeting regime.
Domestic consumption increases with the increase in foreign consumption and there is a real exchange
rate appreciation. The impact on domestic competitiveness now leads to a fall in home production.
As illustrated in Figure 7, when the economy is subject to mark up shocks, optimal monetary policy
departs from price stabilization. The optimal plan reacts to uctuations in the wedge between marginal
utility of consumption and marginal disutility of production. The policy response to a mark up shock
implies an exchange rate depreciation and an increase in the domestic consumption of home goods. As
a result, domestic output increases. As shown in gure 8, this is not the case when the economy is
closed. In this case, ination stabilization is larger, requiring a contraction in the level of economic
activity.
The optimal response to a scal shock is presented in gures 9, 10 and 1115 . Figure 9 compares
the optimal monetary policy with an ination targeting regime. It shows that the exchange rate
depreciation is smaller in the former. Consequently, crowding out in consumption is smaller under the
optimal regime. As a result, whereas output falls under a policy of price stability, domestic production
increases under the optimal plan. Conversely, as portrayed in gure 10, the optimal plan in a closed
economy is closer to an ination target and involves a larger fall in consumption.
15Given that bgtis dened as (G G)
Y
an inovation in bgt is measured in percentages of the GDP.
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These results change signicantly when the goods are complementary in utility. As displayed in
gure 11, when  = 0:7, a scal shock leads to an exchange rate appreciation and a fall in domestic
consumption.
4.2.2 Ranking Standard Policy Rules
Exercises such as the ones shown above demonstrate that the source of the shock a¤ecting the economy
is an important determinant of the performance of policy rules. In the optimal targeting rule, this
is captured by the composition of the target variables bY Tt and cRSTt ; which stipulate how optimal
policy should respond to di¤erent shocks. The quantitative analysis also illustrates the role of the
economys characteristics (that is, variations in the structural parameters such as  and ) in the policy
prescription. In analytical terms this is captured by the formulation of the weights of the variables in
the loss function and in the targeting rule.
In order to verify how robust the results presented in the previous section are (specially regarding the
validity of producer price ination targeting), some sensitivity analysis should be conducted . However,
as shown in section (4) of the appendix, not every combination of parameter specication is consistent
with the second order condition of the minimization problem. For this reason, the computation of the
optimal plan as shown above is not valid for those specications. Therefore, an alternative robustness
check has to be done by evaluating the performance of an ination targeting regime compared with
other standard policy rules for the di¤erent parameter values and types of disturbances. This exercise
is also interesting per se, as it allows the evaluation of policies currently used by international monetary
authorities.
We compute a ranking of policy rules (more specically, domestic ination targeting, CPI ination
targeting and exchange rate peg) for di¤erent values of ;  and . We start by varying  and ; while
maintaining  = 0:4. Alternatively, we can keep the log utility specication and analyze di¤erent
scenarios for  and . Moreover, we consider the case of 1% standard deviation productivity, scal and
mark up shocks16 .
16Kehoe and Perri (2000) nd and estimate of 0.7% for the productivity shock standard deviation. Gali et al (2002) nds
a standard deviation for price mark ups of 4.3% (implying variance of approximately 0.0016). Perotti (2005) estimates
the standard deviation of a government spending shock for various countries. The estimates range from 0.8% to 3.5%.
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Tables 1 and 2 show the policy rule that leads to the highest level of welfare, following a productivity
shock. Domestic ination targeting is the preferred policy rule for low levels of ;  and . A large
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods increases the sensitivity of home demand
to exchange rate movements. As a result, exchange rate uctuations have a higher impact on the rate
of marginal utility of consumption and marginal disutility of production. For this reason, when  is
high, the small open economy benets from adopting an exchange rate peg. The same happens when
the coe¢ cient of risk aversion is large. Moreover, an exchange rate peg becomes superior to PPI or
CPI ination targeting when the economy is relatively open.
The gains or losses of adopting di¤erent policy regimes are represented by the following measure:
W a;bd =
W a  W b
Uc(C)
=
2(1  )(Ua0   U b0)
U(C)
;
where U0 is the expected life time utility of the representative agent. W
a;b
d measures the percentage
di¤erence in steady state consumption under regime a and b. Table 3 illustrates the welfare gains or
losses of adopting an ination targeting rather than an exchange rate peg when the economy is subject
to productivity shocks. Although an exchange rate peg is superior to an ination targeting regime
when ;  and  are large, the quantitative welfare loss is not very signicant: it ranges from 0.001%
to 0.004% of steady state consumption. As shown in section 5.1 when  =  = 1 and the economy
is subject to productivity shocks, a domestic ination target coincides with the optimal policy rule.
In this case, the welfare losses of a xed exchange rate regime is 0.010% of steady state consumption.
Table 9 shows that these costs increase to 0.013% when the economy is relatively closed ( = 1=5):
In the case of foreign shocks, gures for the preferred policy are identical to the case of domestic
productivity shocks. Pegging the exchange rate outperform an ination targeting regime when the
economy is relatively open, and demand is sensitive to exchange rate movements (i.e.,  is large) and
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is small (high levels of ). This is illustrated in tables 5 and
6.
Turning to scal shocks, for intermediate levels of ;  and , CPI targeting is the best of the
However, in the present paper we consider equaly variable shocks, with 2 = 0:0001:
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three standard policy forms evaluated. That is, under these specications, the central bank improves
welfare by targeting a weighted average of domestic ination and exchange rate depreciation. This
is illustrated in tables 7 and 8. However, the cost of imposing an ination targeting regime under
this parametrization is insignicant: at most 0.001% loss in steady state consumption (see highlighted
statistics in table 9 and 10). Moreover, as in the case of foreign and productivity shocks, when ; 
and  are large, xing the exchange rate is the best alternative
In the case of mark up shocks, an ination target is the preferred standard policy only under the
knife-edge specication where  =  = 1 (see table 11). With unitary elasticity of substitution and
 > 1; CPI targeting is the preferred policy rule. In addition, whenever  > 2 pegging the exchange rate
leads to higher welfare than PPI ination targeting. The steady state consumption losses associated
with strict domestic price stabilization compared with a xed exchange rate regime are shown in table
12. When mark up uctuations are the source of disturbance a¤ecting the small open economy,
W IT;PEGd may reach 0.043%, when  =  = 6.
The costs of adopting a welfare inferior policy rule presented in the above tables are small in
magnitude. The shift in steady state consumption is never larger than 0.05%. We should note
however that these costs are of the same order of magnitude as the costs of business cycles reported by
Lucas (1987) (the author estimates a 0.1% shift in steady state consumption).
5 Conclusion
This paper formalizes a small open economy model as a limiting case of a two country general equilib-
rium framework and characterizes its utility-based loss function. It also derives the optimal monetary
plan, represented by a targeting rule, for a small open economy. The setup developed in this work
encompasses, as special cases, the closed economy framework and the small open economy case with
e¢ cient levels of steady state output. As a result, the examination of monetary policy in such envi-
ronments is nested in our analysis.
The utility-based loss function for a small open economy is a quadratic expression in domestic
ination, the output gap and the real exchange rate. This paper demonstrates that a small open
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economy, completely integrated with the rest of the world, should be concerned about exchange rate
variability. Therefore, the optimal policy in a small open economy is not isomorphic to that in a
closed economy and also, it does not prescribe a pure oating exchange rate regime. Price stability
(or domestic ination targeting) is optimal only under a specic parameterization of the model. In
the cases where the economy experiences productivity and foreign shocks exclusively, domestic ination
targeting is only optimal under a particular specication for preferences. If scal disturbances are
also present, price stability as the optimal plan further requires a production subsidy. When these
restrictions on the steady state level output and preferences are relaxed, deviations from inward looking
policies arise in the optimal plan.
Nevertheless, under our benchmark calibration, the optimal monetary policy mimics closely an
ination targeting regime when the economy experiences domestic productivity shocks and external
disturbances. In the case of scal and mark up shocks the optimal plan departs from price stabil-
ity. Moreover, the openness of the economy modies the optimal responses to the referred shocks
signicantly.
The sensitivity analysis exercise demonstrates that ination targeting, when comparing CPI and
exchange rate targeting, is the preferred policy if the economy is relatively closed and its demand is not
sensitive to exchange rate movements. Conversely, if ;  and  are large, the small open economy may
improve welfare by adopting a xed exchange rate regime.
The tools developed in this paper can be applied to di¤erent economic environments. It is important
to notice that the model presented here assumes that there are complete asset markets. Relaxing such
assumption would lead to a more realistic representation of the model. Moreover, the introduction of
asset market imperfections and their welfare consequences would enrich the optimal monetary policy
analysis.
Another interesting extension would involve analyzing scal policy by allowing proportional taxation
to be an endogenous variable. This would enable the investigation of the interaction between scal and
monetary authorities and the optimal policy mix. The small open economy representation allows for
the assessment of interesting issues such as the implication of di¤erent government bond denominations
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for scal policy. Moreover, one could analyze optimal scal arrangements under a xed exchange rate
regime.
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Figure 1: E¢ ciency Analysis
Figure 2: E¢ ciency Analysis - the case of Mark up shocks
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Figure 3: E¢ ciency Analysis - the case of Productivity shocks
Figure 4: E¢ ciency Analysis - the case of Fiscal shocks
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Figure 5: Impulse responses following a Productivity Shock
Figure 6: Impulse responses following a Foreign Shock
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Figure 7: Impulse responses following a Mark up Shock
Figure 8: Impulse responses following a Mark up Shock - Open vs Closed Economy
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Figure 9: Impulse responses following a Fiscal Shock
Figure 10: Impulse responses following a Fiscal Shock - Open vs Closed Economy
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Figure 11: Impulse responses following a Fiscal Shock - varying the elasticity of substitution between
domestic and foreing goods
l \ q 1 2 3 4 5 6
 1/2 IT IT PEG PEG PEG PEG
 1/3 IT IT IT PEG PEG PEG
 1/4 IT IT IT CPI PEG PEG
 1/5 IT IT IT IT PEG PEG
Table 1: Preferred policy rule following an productivity shock - varying the degree of openness and the
intratemporal elasticity of substitution
r \ q 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 IT IT IT PEG PEG PEG
2 IT IT PEG PEG PEG PEG
3 IT IT PEG PEG PEG PEG
4 IT PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
5 IT PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
6 IT PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
Table 2: Preferred policy rule following an productivity shock- varying the intertemporal and intratem-
poral elasticity of substitution
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Table 3: Welfare costs following a productivity shock- varying the intertemporal and intratemporal
elasticity of substitution
r \ q 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0.010% 0.004% 0.001% -0.001% -0.002% -0.002%
2 0.007% 0.001% -0.001% -0.003% -0.003% -0.003%
3 0.006% 0.000% -0.002% -0.003% -0.004% -0.004%
4 0.005% 0.000% -0.002% -0.003% -0.004% -0.004%
5 0.005% 0.000% -0.003% -0.003% -0.004% -0.004%
6 0.004% -0.001% -0.003% -0.004% -0.004% -0.004%
W IT; PEGd
Table 4: Welfare costs following a productivity shock- varying the degree of openness and intratemporal
elasticity of substitution
l \ q 1 2 3 4 5 6
 1/2 0.008% 0.004% 0.002% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001%
 1/3 0.011% 0.004% 0.002% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001%
 1/4 0.012% 0.003% 0.002% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001%
 1/5 0.013% 0.003% 0.002% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001%
W IT; PEGd
l \ q 1 2 3 4 5 6
 1/2 IT IT PEG PEG PEG PEG
 1/3 IT IT IT PEG PEG PEG
 1/4 IT IT IT CPI PEG PEG
 1/5 IT IT IT IT PEG PEG
Table 5: Preferred policy rulefollowing an external shock - varying the degree of openness and the
intratemporal elasticity of substitution
r \ q 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 IT IT IT PEG PEG PEG
2 IT IT PEG PEG PEG PEG
3 IT IT PEG PEG PEG PEG
4 IT PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
5 IT PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
6 IT PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
Table 6: Preferred policy rule following a foreign shock- varying the intertemporal and intratemporal
elasticity of substitution
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l \ q 1 2 3 4 5 6
 1/2 IT CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG
 1/3 IT CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG
 1/4 IT IT CPI PEG PEG PEG
 1/5 IT IT CPI PEG PEG PEG
Table 7: Preferred policy rulefollowing a scal shock.- varying the degree of openness and the intratem-
poral elasticity of substitution
r \ q 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 IT CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG
2 IT PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
3 CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
4 CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
5 CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
6 CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
Table 8: Preferred policy rule following a scal shock- varying the intertemporal and intratemporal
elasticity of substitution
l \ q 1 2 3 4 5 6
 1/2 0.003% 0.000% -0.002% -0.002% -0.003% -0.003%
 1/3 0.003% 0.000% -0.001% -0.002% -0.002% -0.002%
 1/4 0.002% 0.000% -0.001% -0.002% -0.002% -0.002%
 1/5 0.002% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% -0.002% -0.002%
W IT;CPId
Table 9: Welfare costs following a scal shock - varying the degree of openness and intratemporal
elasticity of substitution
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r \ q 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0.003% 0.000% -0.001% -0.002% -0.002% -0.002%
2 0.001% -0.002% -0.003% -0.003% -0.003% -0.003%
3 0.000% -0.002% -0.003% -0.003% -0.003% -0.003%
4 0.000% -0.003% -0.003% -0.004% -0.004% -0.003%
5 -0.001% -0.003% -0.003% -0.004% -0.004% -0.003%
6 -0.001% -0.003% -0.004% -0.004% -0.004% -0.003%
W IT;CPId
Table 10: Welfare costs following a scal shock - varying the intertemporal and intratemporal elasticity
of substitution
r \ q 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 IT CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG
2 CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
3 CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
4 CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
5 CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
6 CPI PEG PEG PEG PEG PEG
Table 11: Preferred policy rule following an mark up shock- varying the intertemporal and intratemporal
elasticity of substitution
r \ q 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 0.029% -0.004% -0.020% -0.029% -0.033% -0.035%
2 0.017% -0.014% -0.028% -0.035% -0.038% -0.040%
3 0.012% -0.017% -0.031% -0.037% -0.040% -0.041%
4 0.009% -0.019% -0.032% -0.038% -0.041% -0.042%
5 0.008% -0.021% -0.033% -0.039% -0.041% -0.042%
6 0.007% -0.021% -0.034% -0.039% -0.042% -0.043%
W IT;PEGd
Table 12: Welfare costs following a mark up shock - varying the degree of openness and intratemporal
elasticity of substitution
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A Appendix: The Steady State
In this appendix we derive the steady state conditions. All variables in steady state are denoted with a
bar. We assume that in steady state 1+ it = 1+ it = 1= and P
H
t =P
H
t 1 = P
F
t =P
F
t 1 = 1. Moreover we
normalize the price indexed such that PH = PF . This implies that PHP = RS = 1: From the demand
equation at Home, we have:
Y = vC +
v(1  n)
n
C +G (A.1)
Y

=
(1  v)n
1  n C + (1  v
)C +G

(A.2)
If we specify the proportion of foreign-produced goods in home consumption as 1   v = (1   n)
and the proportion of home-produced goods in foreign consumption is v = n; and take the limiting
case where n = 0, we have.
Y = (1  )C + C +G (A.3)
And from the Foreign demand we have
Y

= C

+G

(A.4)
Moreover, applying our normalization to the price setting equations we have:
UC(C) = Vy
 
C + (1  )C +G (A.5)
UC(C

) = Vy

C

+G

(A.6)
Where
 =

(1  )(   1)
We are also imply the following notation throughout the appendix
(1  ) = 1

 = 1  (1  )(   1)

0   < 1; > 1
The Symmetric Steady State:
Iterating the complete asset market assumption we have:
RSt = 0

Ct
Ct

(A.7)
where
0 = RS0

C0
C0

(A.8)
So if we assume an initial level of wealth such that 0 = 1; the steady state version of (A.7) imply
C = C

. Moreover, throughout the appendix we assume G

= G = 0. Under this condition, equations
(A.5) and (A.6) imply:  = :
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B Appendix: A Second Order Approximation to the Utility
Function
In this appendix, we derive the rst and second order approximation to the equilibrium conditions of
the model under the assumptions that C = C

and G

= G = 0. Moreover, we obtain the second order
approximation to the utility function in order to address welfare analysis. To simplify and clarify the
algebra, we use the following isoelastic functional forms:
U(Ct) =
C1 t
1   (B.9)
V (yt(h); "Y;T ) =
" y;tyt(h)
+1
 + 1
(B.10)
B.1 Demand
As shown in the text, home demand equation is:
Yt =

PH;t
Pt
  "
(1  )Ct + 

1
RSt
 
Ct
#
+ gt (B.11)
The rst order approximation to demand in the small open economy is therefore:
Y^t =  bpH;t + (1  )C^t + C^t + cRSt + bgt (B.12)
Note that scal shock g^t is dened as Gt GY , allowing for the analysis of this shock even when the
zero steady state government consumption is zero. And the second order approximation to the demand
function is: X
t

d0yyt +
1
2
y0tDyyt + y
0
tDeet

+ s:o:t:i:p = 0 (B.13)
where
yt =
h bYt bCt bpHt cRSt i
et =
h b"yt bt bgt bCt i
d0y =
  1 1      
d0e =

0 0 1 

D0y =
2664
0 0 0 0
0 (1  ) 0  (1  )
0 0 0 0
0  (1  ) 0 2(1  )
3775
D0e =
2664
0 0 0 0
0 0  (1  )  (1  )
0 0  0
0 0   (1  )
3775
B.2 Risk Sharing Equation
In a perfectly integrated capital market, the value of the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is
equated across borders:
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UC
 
Ct+1

UC (Ct )
P t
P t+1
=
UC (Ct+1)
UC (Ct)
St+1Pt
StPt+1
(B.14)
Assuming the symmetric steady state equilibrium, the log linear approximation to the above condi-
tion is:
C^t = C^

t +
1

cRSt (B.15)
Given our utility function specication, equation (B.14) gives rise to a exact log linear expression
and therefore the rst and second order approximation are identical.
In matrix notation, we have:X
Et
t

c0yyt +
1
2
y0tCyyt + y
0
tCeet

+ s:o:t:i:p: = 0 (B.16)
c0y =

0  1 0 1

c0e =

0 0 0 1

C 0y = 0
C 0e = 0
B.3 The Real Exchange Rate
Given that in the rest of the world PF = SP ; equation (23) can be expressed as:
Pt
PH;t
1 
= (1  ) + 

RSt
Pt
PH;t
1 
(B.17)
Therefore, the rst order approximation to the above expression is:
~pH;t =  
cRSt
1   (B.18)
Moreover, the second order approximation to equation (B.17) is:X
Et
t

f 0yyt +
1
2
y0tFyyt + y
0
tFeet

+ s:o:t:i:p: = 0 (B.19)
f 0y =

0 0  (1  )   
f 0e =

0 0 0 0

F 0y = (   1)
2664
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0  1
0 0  1 (1  =(1  ))
3775
F 0y =
2664
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
3775
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B.4 Price Setting
The rst and second-order approximation to the price setting equation follow Benigno and Benigno
(2001) and Benigno and Benigno (2003) 17 . These conditions are derived from the following rst order
condition of sellers that can reset their prices:
Et
(X
()T tUc(CT )

~pt(h)
PH;t
 
YT

~pt(h)
PH;T
PH;T
PT
  T
Vy (~yt;T (h); "Y;t)
Uc(CT )
)
= 0 (B.20)
where
~yt(h) =

~pt(h)
PH;t
 
Yt (B.21)
and
(PH;t)
1  = P 1 H;t 1 + (1  ) (~pt(h))1  (B.22)
With mark up shocks t dened as

( 1)(1 Ht ) ; the the rst order approximation to the price setting
equation can be written in the following way:
bHt = k  bCt + bYt   bpH;t + bt   b"Y;t+ EtbHt+1 (B.23)
where k = (1  )(1  )=(1 + ):
The second order approximation to equation (B.20) can be written as follows:
Qto = 
X
Et
t

a0yyt +
1
2
y0tAyyt + y
0
tAeet +
1
2
a
2
t

+ s:o:t:i:p: (B.24)
a0y =

   1 0 
a0e =
   1 0 0 
A0y =
2664
(2 + )   1 0
  2  0
 1   1 0
0 0 0 0
3775
A0e =
2664
 (1 + ) 1 +  0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
3775
a = ( + 1)

k
B.5 Welfare
Following Benigno and Benigno (2003), the second order approximation to the utility function can be
written as:
U jt = Et
1X
s=t
s t

U(Cjs)  V (yjs; "Y;s)

(B.25)
17For a detail derivation of the rst-order approximation to the price setting see tecnical appendix in Benigno and
Benigno (2001). Benigno and Benigno (2003) have the details on the second-order approximation.
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Wto = Uc CEt0
X
t

w0yyt  
1
2
y0tWyyt   y0tWeet  
1
2
w
2
t

+ s:o:t:i:p (B.26)
w0 =

k
w0y =
  1= 1 0 0 
W 0y =
2664
(1+)
 0 0 0
0  (1  ) 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
3775
W 0e =
2664
   0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
3775
In addition, using the second order approximation to the equilibrium condition derived in section
8.1 to 8.4, we can eliminate the term w0yyt from equation (B.26). In order to do so, we derive the vector
Lx; such that: 
ay dy fy cy

Lx = wy
Where ay; dy; fy; cy were previously dened in this appendix. Therefore, we have:
Lx1 =
1
(+ ) + l

l 1 + (1  )   1 (B.27)
Lx2 =
1
(+ ) + l

( 1   (1  )) + (1  )( + ) (B.28)
Lx3 =
1
(+ ) + l

(   1)(1  ) 1   ( + 1) (B.29)
where l = (   1)(2  )
And the loss function Lto will have the following form:
Lto = Uc CEt0
X
t

1
2
y0tLyyt + y
0
tLeet +
1
2
l
2
t

+ s:o:t:i:p (B.30)
where:
Ly =Wy + Lx1Ay + Lx2Dy + Lx3Fy
Le =We + Lx1Ae + Lx2De
L = w + Lx1a
To write the model just in terms of the output, real exchange rate and ination, we dene the
matrixes N and Ne mapping all endogenous variables into [Yt; Tt] and the errors in the following way:
y0t = N [Yt; Tt] +Neet (B.31)
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N =
2664
1 0
1   l+(1 )
0   (1 )
0 1
3775
Ne =
2664
0 0 0 0
0 0  1 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
3775
Equation (B.30) can therefore be expressed as:
Lto = Uc CEt0
X
t

1
2
hbYt; cRSti0 L0y hbYt; cRSti+ hbYt; cRSti0 L0eet + 12 l2t

+ t:i:p (B.32)
where:
L0y = N
0LyN
L0e = N
0LyNe +N 0Le
Finally, we rewrite the previous equation with variables expressed as deviations from their targets:
Lito = Uc CEt0
X
t

1
2
Y (bYt   bY Tt )2 + 12RS(cRSt   cRSTt )2 + 12(bHt )2

+ s:o:t:i:p (B.33)
where:
Y = ( + )(1  ) + (  1) [ l(1  )  (  )]
(1 + l)
+ Lx1

( + ) + ( + 1)  (  1)
(1 + l)

  Lx2(1  )
2(   1)
(1 + l)
RS =   (+ l)(  1)
(1  )2
+
Lx1l(  1  l)
(1  )2
+
Lx2(   1) [(1  ) + + l]
2
+
Lx3(   1)
1  
 =

k
+ (1 + )

k
Lx1
and
bY Tt = qeyet; and cRSTt = qerset
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with
qey =
1
Y
h

 + Lx1(1 + )  Lx1(1 + ) ( 1)(1 )+Lx21+l 0
i
qeRS =
1
RS
h
0 0 ( 1 l)Lx1(1 ) +
Lx2((1 )+1)( 1)
(1 )
 Lx2(1 )( 1)

i
Moreover, we can write the constraints of the maximization problem as:
bHt = k (Y^t   bY Tt ) + (1  ) 1(cRSt   cRSTt ) + ut+ EtbHt+1 (B.34)
(bYt   bY Tt ) = (cRSt   cRSTt ) (1 + l)(1  ) + ut (B.35)
where
ut =

;
1
1  
 h
(bY Tt   bY Flext ); (cRSTt   cRSFlext )i0
 =

1

;
(1 + l)


and bY Flext and bY Flext are the exible price allocation for output and the real exchange rate:bY Flext = [( + ) + l] 1 n(1 + l)b"Y;t   (1 + l)bt + bgt   l bCt o (B.36)
cRSFlext
(1  ) = [( + ) + l]
 1

n
b"y;t   bt   bgt   ( + ) bCt o (B.37)
B.6 Special Cases
In this section we present the special cases described in the main text.
Special Case 1:
In this case we assume:
1.  = 1
2. No mark-up or scal shocks.
Y = ( + )(1  ) + ((1  )   1)(1  )
RS = 0
 =

k
(1  ) + ((1  )   1)(1  ) 
k(+ )
Moreover:
bY Tt = qeyet = bY Flext = [( + )] 1 fb"y;tg
Special Case 2:
In this case we assume:
1.  = 1
2.  = 1=(1  )
3. No mark-up shocks.
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Y = ( + )(1  )
RS = 0
 =

k
(1  )
Moreover:
bY Tt = qeyet = bY Flext = [( + )] 1 fb"y;t + gtg
Special Case 3: The closed economy
c
cY
=

k( + )
and bY T;ct = "Y;t( + )   (  1)( + 1)t( + )( + + (  1)) + (+ )gt( + )( + + (  1))
bY Flex;ct = "Y;t   t + gt( + )
C Appendix: Proof of determinacy
In this section we show that the optimal targeting rule, together with the policy constraints and the
initial condition for ination delivers a determinate equilibrium. The equilibrium conditions given by
equations (34), (35) and (39) can be rewritten as:
bHt = 1(Y^t   bY Tt ) + kt + EtbHt+1 (C.38)
2(bYt   bY Tt )  3t + 4bHt = 0 (C.39)
where t is a linear combination of shocks and follows a AR(1) process
t = !t 1 + et (C.40)
and
1 = k( + (1 + l)
 1)
2 = (1 + l)Y +
2(1  )2
(1 + l)
RS
3 = 
(1 + l)
2(1  )2
4 = (+ (1 + l))k
Moreover, we can reduce the system given by conditions (C.38) and (C.39) to the following equation:
EtbHt+1   (1 +  + 14=2)bHt + bHt 1 = (13=2 + k)t (C.41)
where t is a stationary shock
18 . The characteristic polynomial associated with this equation is:
P (a) = a2   (1 +  + 14=2)a+ 1 (C.42)
18More specicaly t = et   (1  !)1 1
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Equations (C.38) and (C.39) form a system with one predetermined variable and one endogenous
variable. Therefore, determinacy is guaranteed if the above polynomial has one root inside the unit
circle and one outside. This is true if 2=41 >  1=2(1 + ). More specically:
(1 + l)2Y + 
2(1  )2RS
(1 + l)2(+ (1 + l))2
>   k
2
2(1 + )
(C.43)
D Appendix: Randomization problem
In order to ensure that the policy obtained from the minimization of the loss function is indeed the
best available policy; we should certify that no other random policy plan can be welfare improving.
Equation (34) combined with (35) leads to the following expression:
bHt = k ( +  1(1 + l))(Y^t   bY Tt ) + ut+ EtbHt+1 (D.44)
or alternatively
bHt = k(1 + l) + (1  ) (cRSt   cRSTt ) + ut

+ EtbHt+1 (D.45)
Therefore a random realization that adds 'jvj to t+j ; also increases Y^t by yk
 1('j   'j+1)vj
and cRSt by rsk 1('j   'j+1)vj . Where
rs =

(1 + l) + 
(1  )

(D.46)
and
y = ( + 
 1(1 + l)) (D.47)
Consequently, the total contribution to the loss function is
Uc C
t2vEt0
X
t

k 2('j   'j+1)2 +('j)2

(D.48)
where
 = Y 
2
y +RS
2
rs
It follows that policy randomization cannot improve welfare if the expression given by equation
(D.48) is positive denite. Hence, the rst order conditions to the minimization problem are indeed a
policy optimal if  and  are not both equal to zero and either: (a)   0 and +(1 1=2)2k 2  0
or (b)   0 and + (1  1=2)2k 2  0 holds. This analysis follow closely Woodford and Benigno
(2003). The authors also demonstrate that these conditions coincide with the second order condition
for the linear quadratic optimization problem.
In the case of our small open economy conditions (a) and (b) involve complicated linear combinations
of the structural parameters. Even though they are satised under our benchmark calibration, for many
parameter combinations this is not the case. The following tables illustrate when a randomization is
never welfare improving.
48
r \ q 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Yes Yes Yes No No No
2 No No No No No No
3 No Yes No No No No
4 No No No No No No
5 No No No No No No
6 No No No No No No
Table 13: Parameterization under which the second order condition to the minimization problem is
satised (1)
q \ l 1/2 1/3 1/4 1/5
1 No No Yes Yes
2 No No No Yes
3 No No No Yes
4 No No No No
Table 14: Parameterization under which the second order condition to the minimization problem is
satised (2)
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